Cordy goes poo in snow, gets treat
Jan. 20th, 2005 12:56 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
apollianaWrote about how skepticism does not involve ordinary epistemic assessment, induction, and the Gettier problem. Misdescribed the conditional theory of knowledge in the last response to the Gettier problem (though I included it under what I called "limited defeasibility" in the previous paragraph). 5 pages longer than the metaphysics exam. The new kids have read a lot of new philosophers; I really think those in my year who took this exam last year did it only knowing Quine, Putnam and Kim. I've lost a lot of my curiosity about new philosophers. Hopefully it will return over the weekend.
There are different ways of doing philosophy. When I first started, what philosophers pitted against each other was not arguments, but worldviews. (Something like Azzouni drawing a circle on the board and saying "remember Quine's picture?") The different worldviews were more or less correct according to how well they described the important features of reality, which of course can be anything. Some worldviews might be more useful than others, and that might be their virtue. I'm not sure whether arguments concern details of worldviews or not. My impression is that there isn't much these philosophers who advance arguments against one another (you never see arguments "for" things, only against) have in common. In Aquinas, the arguments seemed extra, as if he were saying: here are the reasons for believing, for those of you who need reasons. If you don't believe in the first place, the arguments will seem tedious. Is anyone actually convinced by arguments? There are philosophical views among the contemporary options I'm drawn to more than others, the 4D universe, for example; but it doesn't seem like the arguments against other views strengthen my conviction. Arguments may serve to regiment our thought, but in the end, all we have are pictures--with more or less detail. And with sufficient detail it's no longer possible to represent them as pictures.
I think Plato may be my favorite philosopher to read. You outline the arguments, which are obvious, and ponder the myths; and clearly the things of more importance are the myths. This way I don't get in trouble for my tendency to think the things of more importance are the myths, as I do with, say, Cavell.
Ultimately I may be happy (mis)using old philosophers for my own purposes. The new philosophers are too medieval.
There are different ways of doing philosophy. When I first started, what philosophers pitted against each other was not arguments, but worldviews. (Something like Azzouni drawing a circle on the board and saying "remember Quine's picture?") The different worldviews were more or less correct according to how well they described the important features of reality, which of course can be anything. Some worldviews might be more useful than others, and that might be their virtue. I'm not sure whether arguments concern details of worldviews or not. My impression is that there isn't much these philosophers who advance arguments against one another (you never see arguments "for" things, only against) have in common. In Aquinas, the arguments seemed extra, as if he were saying: here are the reasons for believing, for those of you who need reasons. If you don't believe in the first place, the arguments will seem tedious. Is anyone actually convinced by arguments? There are philosophical views among the contemporary options I'm drawn to more than others, the 4D universe, for example; but it doesn't seem like the arguments against other views strengthen my conviction. Arguments may serve to regiment our thought, but in the end, all we have are pictures--with more or less detail. And with sufficient detail it's no longer possible to represent them as pictures.
I think Plato may be my favorite philosopher to read. You outline the arguments, which are obvious, and ponder the myths; and clearly the things of more importance are the myths. This way I don't get in trouble for my tendency to think the things of more importance are the myths, as I do with, say, Cavell.
Ultimately I may be happy (mis)using old philosophers for my own purposes. The new philosophers are too medieval.
