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Ethical Theory?
Sep. 20th, 2004 10:11 pmI'm having a hard time with ethical theory. I'm having a hard time figuring out what the standards are by which we should evaluate ethical theories. Standards are presented, but they seem to differ between theorists, and no one ever presents an argument for taking them as fundamental. Someone talks of "moral force" and I have no idea what's meant: in our society, there is force of law; "moral force" is appealed to by individuals to express sentiments--though these sentiments often serve as the foundations of laws.
Theorists occasionally talk about the "motivation" we experience to act ethically as a feature that must be accounted for in a good theory of ethics. But it seems that the motivation to theorize about ethics at all is conspicuously missing. When do ethical concerns arise? They do, in a general sense, for me, in the perspective of living a "good life"; but psychological and social conditions could probably also be given for the situations in which they do. Perhaps if I only think of the many situations in which justice seems missing--or of the interpersonal domains in which minor offenses are constantly endured due to simple rude conduct--then I will be motivated to care about morality. And to devise a theory that "accounts for" it. Sadly, at most moments, I would be glad to drop the attempt to give a first-person, normative account of morality altogether, and talk only of psychological facts (about emotions), legal facts, and sociological facts.
This isn't to say that discussion of which values are better than others, even in the slightest sense, isn't potentially useful. But questions about how morality works, when it doesn't appear to do any work, lack urgency.
What, after all, is morality? The comparison of values (there is no question of values if no one questions them), the occasional conviction that someone has done something wrong, and the occasional motivation to do something for the good of some larger group--possibly under the broader motivation of living the "best" life. These things seem a bit disconnected. Does anything unite them? If so, and if it makes sense to ask for a theory of that unifying concept, then perhaps the enterprise of ethical theory will make sense, too.
Theorists occasionally talk about the "motivation" we experience to act ethically as a feature that must be accounted for in a good theory of ethics. But it seems that the motivation to theorize about ethics at all is conspicuously missing. When do ethical concerns arise? They do, in a general sense, for me, in the perspective of living a "good life"; but psychological and social conditions could probably also be given for the situations in which they do. Perhaps if I only think of the many situations in which justice seems missing--or of the interpersonal domains in which minor offenses are constantly endured due to simple rude conduct--then I will be motivated to care about morality. And to devise a theory that "accounts for" it. Sadly, at most moments, I would be glad to drop the attempt to give a first-person, normative account of morality altogether, and talk only of psychological facts (about emotions), legal facts, and sociological facts.
This isn't to say that discussion of which values are better than others, even in the slightest sense, isn't potentially useful. But questions about how morality works, when it doesn't appear to do any work, lack urgency.
What, after all, is morality? The comparison of values (there is no question of values if no one questions them), the occasional conviction that someone has done something wrong, and the occasional motivation to do something for the good of some larger group--possibly under the broader motivation of living the "best" life. These things seem a bit disconnected. Does anything unite them? If so, and if it makes sense to ask for a theory of that unifying concept, then perhaps the enterprise of ethical theory will make sense, too.
