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apolliana1. Memory for details of events.
2. Memory for what it was like to experience an event.
These seem to be separable, and I haven't yet seen them clearly separated. (1) blends more easily into Semantic Memory, memory for facts. (2) will include facts, but almost accidentally. You start to re-experience the event mentally, and the facts follow. The two are distinguished in that you can have (1) without (2): you can remember the details automatically, the way semantic memories are usually remembered, without putting oneself in one's state of mind at the time.
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Visual agnosia, of which the famous prosopagnosia is a subtype, results in an inability to apply concepts to things one sees. "John," a famous visual agnosic, when asked what an object is, must reason from sense-data-like facts about the object's shape and color and size to a conclusion--which is often wrong.
It's interesting which faculties can go wrong as a whole. John might be the best instance of an "aspect-blind" person, as he never sees objects as anything at all (although of course in the normal case, in which the concepts are automatically applied to the world, it's not technically "seeing-as"). It would perhaps be more accurate to say John is an instance of the total failure of direct perception of objects. This is of note to me as a proponent of the possibility of such bottom-up reasoning about not objects but one's own mental states.
But of course John does not have the parallel disability with respect to his internal states, so these domains--objects of vision in the world, and one's own mental states--are apparently separable. (It would be very interesting if 'recognizing' completely unvisualizable things like one's own mental states were tied to the ability to recognize things visually....in the way that my own autobiographical memories combine sensory detail with mental states.)
2. Memory for what it was like to experience an event.
These seem to be separable, and I haven't yet seen them clearly separated. (1) blends more easily into Semantic Memory, memory for facts. (2) will include facts, but almost accidentally. You start to re-experience the event mentally, and the facts follow. The two are distinguished in that you can have (1) without (2): you can remember the details automatically, the way semantic memories are usually remembered, without putting oneself in one's state of mind at the time.
***
Visual agnosia, of which the famous prosopagnosia is a subtype, results in an inability to apply concepts to things one sees. "John," a famous visual agnosic, when asked what an object is, must reason from sense-data-like facts about the object's shape and color and size to a conclusion--which is often wrong.
It's interesting which faculties can go wrong as a whole. John might be the best instance of an "aspect-blind" person, as he never sees objects as anything at all (although of course in the normal case, in which the concepts are automatically applied to the world, it's not technically "seeing-as"). It would perhaps be more accurate to say John is an instance of the total failure of direct perception of objects. This is of note to me as a proponent of the possibility of such bottom-up reasoning about not objects but one's own mental states.
But of course John does not have the parallel disability with respect to his internal states, so these domains--objects of vision in the world, and one's own mental states--are apparently separable. (It would be very interesting if 'recognizing' completely unvisualizable things like one's own mental states were tied to the ability to recognize things visually....in the way that my own autobiographical memories combine sensory detail with mental states.)
