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Consciousness, and Other Imaginary Things
Aug. 12th, 2013 01:32 pmOne thing rankles me in philosophy of mind. (Well, more than one; but we'll stick to the most important.) The word 'consciousness' has no clear meaning. The central object of numerous theories is hopelessly vague. And this central unclarity is the reason so many theories fail to explain 'consciousness.' There isn't any. Rather, there are (a)-(h) below:
'Conscious' can mean:
(a) awake
(b) responding to one's environment
(c) that one notices something (is conscious of it; problem: unconscious noticing--it is not necessarily true that when one notices something one notices that one notices it)
(d) and if (c) that one has a thought about the thing one notices ("that's a big sheep!")
(e) that one notices that one notices something--or has a thought about having a thought about it ("I'm thinking 'that's a big sheep!'"); recursion
(f) that one is aware of all one's thoughts and observations as one's thoughts and observations as they occur (this approaches the ordinary meaning of 'self-conscious')
(g) having experience at all--that there is something it's like to be the being I am
(h) and in French and undergraduate, 'conscience' also means, well, conscience.
This is a problem. At the very least, excluding meaning (h), there are multiple 'levels' to being conscious. I am therefore rarely sure what any theory is trying to explain. And I very much doubt that the same explanation will account for all of them, as plenty of creatures have experiences but do not have thoughts about those experiences or recursively reflect on their thoughts about those experiences. Higher Order Thought/Representation theories aim to explain (a), (b) and (g) through recursion (e); but clearly (a), (b) and (g) do not require (e). But First Order Representationalist theories are misguided, as well.
The capacity to have experiences (meanings a, b and g) and the capacity to have thoughts (meanings c-f) seem to me to be separate capacities, which many--no, most, if not all--theories run together.
Insofar as a theory speaks of representations, it is speaking of thoughts, not experiences. Any representational theory of consciousness, then, is really a theory of thoughts. How it's possible to mentally represent things, in thoughts or images, is a very important issue. But it's not the same issue as how it's possible to have experiences, for there to be something it's like to be whatever one is.
The danger of saying that experience represents things is that then experience--which is not necessarily thought-like in structure--becomes infected with thought-like structure. This makes experience look overly cognitive. Concepts without intuitions are empty, after all.
The fact that we are capable of having thoughts may affect the kind of experience we have. Thoughts do in fact creep into phenomenal life. It is very hard to even talk about experience without talking about thoughts about one's experience. But assuming phenomenal life is of the same nature as thoughts gets mental life wrong, and certainly does not explain 'consciousness' in all its meanings. Experience does not represent things. Thoughts represent things. A theory of how experience 'represents' things is thereby a theory of thoughts about experience, not of experience itself. 'Consciousness,' so far as same theories aim to explain it, is a matter of our thoughts about our experiences. And since 'thoughts about experiences' is much clearer in meaning, I suggest everyone henceforth use this more accurate expression.
'Conscious' can mean:
(a) awake
(b) responding to one's environment
(c) that one notices something (is conscious of it; problem: unconscious noticing--it is not necessarily true that when one notices something one notices that one notices it)
(d) and if (c) that one has a thought about the thing one notices ("that's a big sheep!")
(e) that one notices that one notices something--or has a thought about having a thought about it ("I'm thinking 'that's a big sheep!'"); recursion
(f) that one is aware of all one's thoughts and observations as one's thoughts and observations as they occur (this approaches the ordinary meaning of 'self-conscious')
(g) having experience at all--that there is something it's like to be the being I am
(h) and in French and undergraduate, 'conscience' also means, well, conscience.
This is a problem. At the very least, excluding meaning (h), there are multiple 'levels' to being conscious. I am therefore rarely sure what any theory is trying to explain. And I very much doubt that the same explanation will account for all of them, as plenty of creatures have experiences but do not have thoughts about those experiences or recursively reflect on their thoughts about those experiences. Higher Order Thought/Representation theories aim to explain (a), (b) and (g) through recursion (e); but clearly (a), (b) and (g) do not require (e). But First Order Representationalist theories are misguided, as well.
The capacity to have experiences (meanings a, b and g) and the capacity to have thoughts (meanings c-f) seem to me to be separate capacities, which many--no, most, if not all--theories run together.
Insofar as a theory speaks of representations, it is speaking of thoughts, not experiences. Any representational theory of consciousness, then, is really a theory of thoughts. How it's possible to mentally represent things, in thoughts or images, is a very important issue. But it's not the same issue as how it's possible to have experiences, for there to be something it's like to be whatever one is.
The danger of saying that experience represents things is that then experience--which is not necessarily thought-like in structure--becomes infected with thought-like structure. This makes experience look overly cognitive. Concepts without intuitions are empty, after all.
The fact that we are capable of having thoughts may affect the kind of experience we have. Thoughts do in fact creep into phenomenal life. It is very hard to even talk about experience without talking about thoughts about one's experience. But assuming phenomenal life is of the same nature as thoughts gets mental life wrong, and certainly does not explain 'consciousness' in all its meanings. Experience does not represent things. Thoughts represent things. A theory of how experience 'represents' things is thereby a theory of thoughts about experience, not of experience itself. 'Consciousness,' so far as same theories aim to explain it, is a matter of our thoughts about our experiences. And since 'thoughts about experiences' is much clearer in meaning, I suggest everyone henceforth use this more accurate expression.
