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At the start of my ethics course, in the hopes of rousing students from their relativistic slumbers, I've been assigning a paper evaluating Bernard Williams's argument against relativism. Briefly, it is that the 3 tenets below are inconsistent. In particular, (1) conflicts with (3) because while (1) defines 'right' only within a given societal context, (3) uses 'wrong' (an analogue of 'right') in a trans-societal sense. Therefore relativism cannot consistently imply a universal policy of tolerance/non-interference.
1. 'Right' means 'right for a given soclety.'
2. 'Right for a given society' means 'right in a functionalist sense.'
3. It is wrong to interfere with the values of another society
I've said before that I think the problem of how to define 'society' is a red herring. Let's read 'society' in an indeterminately limited way, roughly similar to 'idiolect.'
A student pointed out recently that according to Williams's argument, it's hard to know what position the relativist (who wants to remain so) can take when interacting with other societies. She cannot say "it's WRONG to interfere"; but nor can she say "it's RIGHT to interfere." She has to remain neutral on tolerance--and it's hard to see what that could amount to. The relativist would seem to have a position based on the possibility of alternate value systems that she can never interact with in any way.
This is either a far more serious problem with relativism than the first, or a flaw in Williams's argument. But a map of the possible positions helps to clarify things.
The argument seems to leave us with three options:
(a) Keep relativism (1), and reject tolerance (3). Relativistic engagement.
(b) Keep tolerance (3), and reject relativism (1). Dogmatic disengagement.
(c) Reject relativism (1) and tolerance (3). Dogmatic engagement.
Option a
If we take this option, we'll have many different definitions of 'right' without the command to be tolerant of them. In practice, this might entail that when Society A meets Society B, they (i) fight, or (ii) converse productively. When they converse, they de facto belong to the same society, there being no private language and all that.
This is the way around Williams's conclusion that first sprung to my mind.
Option b
If we reject relativism but keep tolerance, our motivation for tolerance would be purely practical, which I suspect in reality it often is.
Option c
We all know what option c entails. I'd rather not think about it.
In reality people often adopt these positions successively, for the situations they suit--which is eminently pragmatic. In any case, I think the apparent absurdity of the fact that either a pro- or con- position on claim (3) conflicts with (1) is resolvable.
1. 'Right' means 'right for a given soclety.'
2. 'Right for a given society' means 'right in a functionalist sense.'
3. It is wrong to interfere with the values of another society
I've said before that I think the problem of how to define 'society' is a red herring. Let's read 'society' in an indeterminately limited way, roughly similar to 'idiolect.'
A student pointed out recently that according to Williams's argument, it's hard to know what position the relativist (who wants to remain so) can take when interacting with other societies. She cannot say "it's WRONG to interfere"; but nor can she say "it's RIGHT to interfere." She has to remain neutral on tolerance--and it's hard to see what that could amount to. The relativist would seem to have a position based on the possibility of alternate value systems that she can never interact with in any way.
This is either a far more serious problem with relativism than the first, or a flaw in Williams's argument. But a map of the possible positions helps to clarify things.
The argument seems to leave us with three options:
(a) Keep relativism (1), and reject tolerance (3). Relativistic engagement.
(b) Keep tolerance (3), and reject relativism (1). Dogmatic disengagement.
(c) Reject relativism (1) and tolerance (3). Dogmatic engagement.
Option a
If we take this option, we'll have many different definitions of 'right' without the command to be tolerant of them. In practice, this might entail that when Society A meets Society B, they (i) fight, or (ii) converse productively. When they converse, they de facto belong to the same society, there being no private language and all that.
This is the way around Williams's conclusion that first sprung to my mind.
Option b
If we reject relativism but keep tolerance, our motivation for tolerance would be purely practical, which I suspect in reality it often is.
Option c
We all know what option c entails. I'd rather not think about it.
In reality people often adopt these positions successively, for the situations they suit--which is eminently pragmatic. In any case, I think the apparent absurdity of the fact that either a pro- or con- position on claim (3) conflicts with (1) is resolvable.
