What I may ask McDowell

What has always bugged me about pretty much all of McDowell's mind-related work is how easy he seems to think the conceptualization of the world is. It's taken for granted that showing things from the knower's/agent's/perceiver's perspective means showing a world readily conceptualized, in which sense data seem to appear. But sense data do make appearances in our experience, in cases of misperception, for example, when we discover that we saw something 'the wrong way,' say, in a dark room. Sometimes we reason about them. I suppose he might say that we're still experiencing those qualities as out in the world rather than....wherever sense data are supposed to be. But I'm not sure that's terribly important: only in cases of what I call 'non object-directed' sensation are they not. (This is my whole thing; to a large extent I've been developing it in reaction to McDowell.)

This is supposed to be a question, though, so it needs a question mark: ?

Also, what's with all the horny dilemmas?