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Rule-Following & Action Again!
Oct. 23rd, 2009 06:11 pmDiscussion on rule-following & phil. of action, referencing the papers I was referencing then; it finally became clear to me why my approach was so odd. I was, of course, employed in addressing a different problem. The normal analogy to make between the two areas is that both are concerned with normativity-grounding: e.g. in what do our rules for action/right action/meaning have their basis? Is there something in which my following the rule consists? And thus we get the same regress argument against mental entities(interpretations, judgments, etc.) in which being guided consists in both.
This is all well and good, but I don't really care about normativity. That is, I don't feel worried about its..solidity. And I'm vaguely disturbed by the thought of looking for that in which right action consists.
I do, however, love a good regress. And a good regress can have a number of contributing factors, and I think there are more here than the desire for something that "meaning plus by 'plus'" consists in. At the time, I was struck by the moment of understanding a rule ("in a flash") and knowing how to go on. This, it seemed, was remarkably like what happens when we learn how to do some physical action, and literally know how to go on. What does that consist in? Phenomenologically, it seems to consist of very little--we can articulate. In fact there is a conspicuous absense of things we can about what happens when we understand some idea or how to do something.
Both approaches ask for a kind of grounding, but the grounding I am interested in is not as obviously justificatory. Its only clear purpose is to make clear what happens at these moments, and why it is the way it is. Its purpose is only the elucidation of phenomenology, and of the way that phenomenology correctly relates to our capacities for language and reasoning. And the 'blindness' at the root of knowing what to do or how to go on may be a by-product of the regress argument-favorable approach: asking for something in the mind that will explain something about our experience. If what we find is an ordinary-language mental entity it won't be a completely convincing explanation, since it will be too close to what needs explaining. If what we find is completely external, it won't seem apt as an explanation of experience.
*******
This generality about regress arguments was discussed at the time. Further confirmation: Yes, I have absolutely come to the right place. But Yes, I am still comepletely crazy.
This is all well and good, but I don't really care about normativity. That is, I don't feel worried about its..solidity. And I'm vaguely disturbed by the thought of looking for that in which right action consists.
I do, however, love a good regress. And a good regress can have a number of contributing factors, and I think there are more here than the desire for something that "meaning plus by 'plus'" consists in. At the time, I was struck by the moment of understanding a rule ("in a flash") and knowing how to go on. This, it seemed, was remarkably like what happens when we learn how to do some physical action, and literally know how to go on. What does that consist in? Phenomenologically, it seems to consist of very little--we can articulate. In fact there is a conspicuous absense of things we can about what happens when we understand some idea or how to do something.
Both approaches ask for a kind of grounding, but the grounding I am interested in is not as obviously justificatory. Its only clear purpose is to make clear what happens at these moments, and why it is the way it is. Its purpose is only the elucidation of phenomenology, and of the way that phenomenology correctly relates to our capacities for language and reasoning. And the 'blindness' at the root of knowing what to do or how to go on may be a by-product of the regress argument-favorable approach: asking for something in the mind that will explain something about our experience. If what we find is an ordinary-language mental entity it won't be a completely convincing explanation, since it will be too close to what needs explaining. If what we find is completely external, it won't seem apt as an explanation of experience.
*******
This generality about regress arguments was discussed at the time. Further confirmation: Yes, I have absolutely come to the right place. But Yes, I am still comepletely crazy.
