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Rules, Agreement, Judgments
Apr. 24th, 2005 09:14 pmPI 201: This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with a rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with a rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (Paragraph 2) It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it (emphasis mine). What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we would call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. (Paragraph 3) Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.
211: How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself--whatever instruction you give him?--Well, how do I know?----If that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.
217: "How am I to obey a rule?"---if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. (Paragraph 2) If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (Paragraph 3) (Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing.)
224: The word "agreement" and the word "rule" are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.
241: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"---It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
242: If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.--It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.
245: For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression?
"Truth, however, rests upon agreement with the object, with regard to which, consequently, the judgments of every understanding must agree. The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true; for in that case there is at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgments, regardless of the difference among the subjects, rests on the common ground, namely the object, with which they therefore all agree and through which the truth of the judgment is proved" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A820/B848-A821/B849).
211: How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself--whatever instruction you give him?--Well, how do I know?----If that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.
217: "How am I to obey a rule?"---if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. (Paragraph 2) If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (Paragraph 3) (Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing.)
224: The word "agreement" and the word "rule" are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.
241: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"---It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
242: If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.--It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.
245: For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression?
"Truth, however, rests upon agreement with the object, with regard to which, consequently, the judgments of every understanding must agree. The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true; for in that case there is at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgments, regardless of the difference among the subjects, rests on the common ground, namely the object, with which they therefore all agree and through which the truth of the judgment is proved" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A820/B848-A821/B849).
