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The primacy of practical reason
Apr. 20th, 2005 02:08 amIn Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran makes the following claim: "unlike either descriptive or evaluative inquiry, reflective (deliberative) questioning takes upon itself the capacity to play a constituting role in determining the psychological facts themselves." As a good Kantian-leaning person and reader of "Must We Mean What We Say?" and "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy," this statement has me confused. In the first, Cavell seems to say that what we say in all our modes of discourse determines what the facts are for us: our words commit us to things. In the second essay, Cavell elaborates this with respect to evaluative statements (aesthetic judgments). When we say "Beethoven was better than Mozart," we immediately become responsible for justification (if asked for it). We must be prepared to say any number of other things to defend our statement, excuse it, rephrase it, and so on. Evaluative inquiry does determine some facts, and specifically for us (and facts for us are the kind Moran is interested in).
But does evaluative inquiry determine psychological facts? At first, the distinction between psychological facts "for us" and non-psychological ones seems unnecessary. Moran, however, does frequently refer to a kind of self-knowledge as "uninteresting": knowledge of one's "parentage" or "tax bracket" fall into this category. Psychological facts might, then, be facts about what we believe or hope or fear--facts about our propositional attitudes. The idea that we can have purely factual, or theoretical, knowledge of these attitudes is precisely what he is trying to undermine. The uniqueness of deliberative inquiry (or "practical reason") is that it creates these attitudes. We arrive at what we believe, e.g., through deliberation.
These attitudes would seem to apply to our other commitments in the world, as well. Not that they determine or are directly determined by those commitments, but that our actions and words will imply some facts about us, and what we do will commit us to dealing with whatever others ascribe to us. Sometimes we find out what we think through talking. (Cavell on self knowledge and practical reason.)
Perhaps evaluative inquiry doesn't determine the facts for us in quite the same way as deliberative inquiry. At least, this is so if one sees deliberation as something that goes on in the head and evaluation as an activity carried on among human beings. But publicity isn't necessary. We needn't have witnesses to have something to say. Only that the responsibilities entailed by what we have to say will extend in different directions in various activities with people. The Wittgensteinian would say, "we aren't deliberating all the time"; which is true. What the facts are for us can be laid out by different means (others' accusations or proddings), and we may commit ourselves by impulse. But, I think Moran would say, unless we ask ourselves questions like "is this what I'm to believe?" those commitments may not be ones we're willing to take full responsibility for.
But does evaluative inquiry determine psychological facts? At first, the distinction between psychological facts "for us" and non-psychological ones seems unnecessary. Moran, however, does frequently refer to a kind of self-knowledge as "uninteresting": knowledge of one's "parentage" or "tax bracket" fall into this category. Psychological facts might, then, be facts about what we believe or hope or fear--facts about our propositional attitudes. The idea that we can have purely factual, or theoretical, knowledge of these attitudes is precisely what he is trying to undermine. The uniqueness of deliberative inquiry (or "practical reason") is that it creates these attitudes. We arrive at what we believe, e.g., through deliberation.
These attitudes would seem to apply to our other commitments in the world, as well. Not that they determine or are directly determined by those commitments, but that our actions and words will imply some facts about us, and what we do will commit us to dealing with whatever others ascribe to us. Sometimes we find out what we think through talking. (Cavell on self knowledge and practical reason.)
Perhaps evaluative inquiry doesn't determine the facts for us in quite the same way as deliberative inquiry. At least, this is so if one sees deliberation as something that goes on in the head and evaluation as an activity carried on among human beings. But publicity isn't necessary. We needn't have witnesses to have something to say. Only that the responsibilities entailed by what we have to say will extend in different directions in various activities with people. The Wittgensteinian would say, "we aren't deliberating all the time"; which is true. What the facts are for us can be laid out by different means (others' accusations or proddings), and we may commit ourselves by impulse. But, I think Moran would say, unless we ask ourselves questions like "is this what I'm to believe?" those commitments may not be ones we're willing to take full responsibility for.
