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I'd been thinking that one argument Evans might but doesn't make for his requirement that to successfully refer to yourself using 'I' you must possess the ability to locate yourself in space is the following: without space, there would be no other selves and thus no need to distinguish between yourself and other entities.

This of course is implicit in what he says about Strawson's "Sounds" chapter, where Strawson himself concludes that although we can achieve an analogue of spatial distance in the sound-world via the master-sound, we can't as easily make sense of distinguishing between oneself--Hero, hearing the sounds--and other entities. (And very possibly one reason it makes more sense to do this in a spatial world is that we can close our eyes and thus separate ourselves from the things we see.)

I had been thinking this, without knowing that Strawson himself suggested such a thing, at the opening of the subsequent chapter, "Persons":

"We drew a picture of a purely auditory experience, and elaborated it to a point at which it seemed that the being whose experience it was--if any such being were possible at all--might recognize sound-universals and reidentify sound-particulars and in general form for himself an idea of his auditory world; but still, it seemed, he would have no place for the idea of himself as the subject of this experience, would make no distinction between a special item in his world, namely himself, and the other items in it. Would it not seem utterly strange to suggest that he might distinguish himself as one item among others in his auditory world, that is, as a sound or sequence of sounds? For how could such a thing--a sound--be also what had all those experiences? Yet to have the idea of himself, must he not have the idea of the subject of experiences, of that which has them? So it might begin to look impossible that he should have the idea of himself--or at any rate the right idea. For to have the idea at all, it seems that it must be an idea of some particular thing of which he has experience, and which is set over against or contrasted with other things of which he has experience, but which are not himself. But if it is just an item within his experience of which he has this idea, how can it be the idea of that which has all of his experiences? (Individuals, 88-9).

This is an argument to the conclusion that the no-space world is solipsistic. If there is no space, there will be no use for 'I.' We might also infer that if there is a use for 'I', there is space. It would seem to be a further step that one be able to locate oneself within that space.

Evans is also concerned to explain how our indexicals and demonstratives link up with the objective world. And thinking about ourselves as positioned in the objective world, he thinks, requires knowing something--which, I believe, is actually quite minimal--about where in that world one is. I take this as roughly meaning that one has the capacity to use a map, even if one doesn't currently have the knowledge it would bestow upon one. It is the requirement that one be able in principle to link up one's egocentric space with objective space. This might have the consequence that small children who do not yet possess this ability do not refer to themselves in quite as rich a way as adults do (if indeed we wish to describe it as successful reference), but that it a consequence that seems correct.


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