Norms and the Third Person
May. 4th, 2010 04:21 amWhen a rational person does something a certain way, we assume she has a reason, and might wonder what, and if we should be doing the same ourselves. That is, we wonder if, given certain other values we have, action X would be in accord with, or a means towards living in harmony with those values.
Most of the norms we meet with in this manner are hypothetical. If we should have or follow them, it is because we value something else. Here is not the place to dispute whether there are intrinsically valuable things at which regress of values-justification must stop, though it's interesting that this seemingly basic question gets pushed aside in academic philosophy in favor of the reduction of evaluative terms to non-evaluative terms. I think we can assume for the present both that there are intrinsically valuable things for individuals at least, and that certain evaluative terms at least do not require reduction.
Now, this trying on of norms that we do requires taking an inventory of the things that we do value and their relative priorities. This may or may not explicitly take the form of a comparison with the person who adheres to said norms. This dynamic gets added complexity if one takes into account what we should do if we have the values we ought to have. It's easy for talk of 'values we ought to have' to sound pedantic and insulting, but as children we're often faced with adults doing things in accord with values we don't know enough about to hold explicitly. The same dynamic happens for beginning students in various fields.
What's going on when we try on or adopt strategies for aiming at values, is, I think, a process of re-conceptualizing oneself as one with such-and-such values, placing oneself in the category of those with such-and-such values, for whom it is true that acting in a certain way will help realize those values, and finally, getting oneself so to act. The third person perspective enters when we place ourselves in the category of people who want X, for whom it is true that doing action Y will help achieve X. And the managerial coup of making the action happen, though a mystery to me as action in general is, requires distance as well. Actually putting one's plan into action, depending on the complexity of the action, may require acting as a spokesperson for one's values, for the person one is when 'at home.' That is, we must repeat this self-classifying thought quite often in trying to achieve the things we value. This has largely to do with dealings with other people and positioning oneself among them, which is necessary at almost every stage of getting anything done.
I make much of this because I find the shift between living in my 'natural state' and constantly positioning myself among others jarring. I can do the latter fine, but it puts me into a kind of overdrive. It's exhausting, and a bit distracting. Most of my thinking happens in the natural state, and I suspect that it's easier to move from social overdrive to the natural thinking state than vice-versa. Possibly. In any case, it's a marked contrast: a contrast between being a transparent eyeball and being the end of a charged wire.
As a side note, I suspect it is part of my dislike of philosophical ethics that I simply do not think we do or should take these third person perspectives upon ourselves at all times. There would be no self left to look at. (Cavell: "then we might never be found" ("Argument of the Ordinary," end.)) The 'rational agent' is not a concept that I find very intuitive--certainly not basic. Experience in its ordinary form (when it's at home) is not that of acting for reasons, or modeling one's behavior on others' according to values. It's sensations, thoughts, and proprioception. When we do ordinary actions, these too are smooth and habitual. We do not need to categorize ourselves or our goals. These actions just happen. I actually think that all actions 'just happen'; without our capacity for 'basic actions' for which no instructions can be given, no higher order actions would be possible, and all higher order actions are reducible to them. What is most puzzling to me is how action 'happens' at all, secondarily how we implement complicated plans for action. The basic thing, and then the detached orchestration. This is all to argue for a distinction between a way of experiencing things in which one is fully immersed in one's own point of view, and another in which one places one's point of view on a map of possible points of view and actions one can take to advance them.
The upshot of these considerations, I think, is that norms do in fact require--if not society, then the ability to take a detached perspective upon one's values and goals that is most often taken in the context of comparing one's values and goals to those of others. Society may not be absolutely necessary, but the ability to conceive of "a person who has value X" is. The hypothetical nature of action-guiding norms may be necessary.
(It is becoming increasingly apparent with this, along with my utter contempt for all questions concerning justification in any philosophical subfield, that I am more of an introspective psychologist than a philosopher.)
Most of the norms we meet with in this manner are hypothetical. If we should have or follow them, it is because we value something else. Here is not the place to dispute whether there are intrinsically valuable things at which regress of values-justification must stop, though it's interesting that this seemingly basic question gets pushed aside in academic philosophy in favor of the reduction of evaluative terms to non-evaluative terms. I think we can assume for the present both that there are intrinsically valuable things for individuals at least, and that certain evaluative terms at least do not require reduction.
Now, this trying on of norms that we do requires taking an inventory of the things that we do value and their relative priorities. This may or may not explicitly take the form of a comparison with the person who adheres to said norms. This dynamic gets added complexity if one takes into account what we should do if we have the values we ought to have. It's easy for talk of 'values we ought to have' to sound pedantic and insulting, but as children we're often faced with adults doing things in accord with values we don't know enough about to hold explicitly. The same dynamic happens for beginning students in various fields.
What's going on when we try on or adopt strategies for aiming at values, is, I think, a process of re-conceptualizing oneself as one with such-and-such values, placing oneself in the category of those with such-and-such values, for whom it is true that acting in a certain way will help realize those values, and finally, getting oneself so to act. The third person perspective enters when we place ourselves in the category of people who want X, for whom it is true that doing action Y will help achieve X. And the managerial coup of making the action happen, though a mystery to me as action in general is, requires distance as well. Actually putting one's plan into action, depending on the complexity of the action, may require acting as a spokesperson for one's values, for the person one is when 'at home.' That is, we must repeat this self-classifying thought quite often in trying to achieve the things we value. This has largely to do with dealings with other people and positioning oneself among them, which is necessary at almost every stage of getting anything done.
I make much of this because I find the shift between living in my 'natural state' and constantly positioning myself among others jarring. I can do the latter fine, but it puts me into a kind of overdrive. It's exhausting, and a bit distracting. Most of my thinking happens in the natural state, and I suspect that it's easier to move from social overdrive to the natural thinking state than vice-versa. Possibly. In any case, it's a marked contrast: a contrast between being a transparent eyeball and being the end of a charged wire.
As a side note, I suspect it is part of my dislike of philosophical ethics that I simply do not think we do or should take these third person perspectives upon ourselves at all times. There would be no self left to look at. (Cavell: "then we might never be found" ("Argument of the Ordinary," end.)) The 'rational agent' is not a concept that I find very intuitive--certainly not basic. Experience in its ordinary form (when it's at home) is not that of acting for reasons, or modeling one's behavior on others' according to values. It's sensations, thoughts, and proprioception. When we do ordinary actions, these too are smooth and habitual. We do not need to categorize ourselves or our goals. These actions just happen. I actually think that all actions 'just happen'; without our capacity for 'basic actions' for which no instructions can be given, no higher order actions would be possible, and all higher order actions are reducible to them. What is most puzzling to me is how action 'happens' at all, secondarily how we implement complicated plans for action. The basic thing, and then the detached orchestration. This is all to argue for a distinction between a way of experiencing things in which one is fully immersed in one's own point of view, and another in which one places one's point of view on a map of possible points of view and actions one can take to advance them.
The upshot of these considerations, I think, is that norms do in fact require--if not society, then the ability to take a detached perspective upon one's values and goals that is most often taken in the context of comparing one's values and goals to those of others. Society may not be absolutely necessary, but the ability to conceive of "a person who has value X" is. The hypothetical nature of action-guiding norms may be necessary.
(It is becoming increasingly apparent with this, along with my utter contempt for all questions concerning justification in any philosophical subfield, that I am more of an introspective psychologist than a philosopher.)